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ARGUMENT
I.

The Definition of Imperfect Self-Defense Asserted by
the State is Clearly Incorrect.

The State incorrectly asserts that the difference between
perfect self defense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) and
imperfect self defense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-205(1) (c) (3)
is as follows:
If the actor's actual, subjective belief is
objectively reasonable and legally justified because
the circumstances are as he objectively and
reasonably believes them to be, then his conduct
would constitute a self-defense to homicide. If, on
the other hand, his actual, subjective belief is
objectively reasonable but is not legally justified
because he is mistaken about the circumstances, then
his conduct would be mitigated to manslaughter.

Appellee's Br. at 23. In spite of the State's assertions
that this is the "plain-language interpretation of the law,"
there

is

no

basis

in

the

language

of

these

statutory

provisions, nor in the case law, to support the State's
assertions in this regard.
With regards to perfect self-defense, it is has long been
fundamental, both at common law and under Utah criminal code,
that it does not matter at all if the defendant turns out to
be mistaken in his belief that force is required to defend
himself, as

long as a reasonable person would have believed

that force was necessary under the same circumstances.

For

instance, in State v. Starks, 627 P. 2d 88 (Utah 1981), the
Utah Supreme Court held that the following jury instruction
properly stated the law governing self-defense:
An actual danger is not necessary to establish selfdefense. If one is confronted by the appearance of
peril which arouses in his mind, as a reasonable
person, an honest conviction that he is about to
suffer death or serious bodily injury, and if a
reasonable person in a like situation, seeing and
knowing the same facts, would be justified in
believing himself in danger, his right to seLf
defense is the same whether such danger is real or
merely apparent.
To illustrate, assume a woman living alone sees a man
coming through her basement window in the middle of the night,
and believing him to be a burglar, and that her life is in
2

danger, she shoots him.

Later, she discovers that the man is

her younger brother who needed a place to sleep, having been
kicked out of their parents' house, and who came in through the
basement window only because he did not want to wake his
sister.

If a reasonable woman in similar circumstances would

have believed her life was in danger, then the woman is
entitled to the complete defense of self-defense, even though
the circumstances did not turn out to be as she had first
perceived them.
Yet, according

to the State's

interpretation

of the

statute, the woman would be entitled to a complete defense only
if the man turned out to be an actual murderer or rapist, as
she first perceived, and would be guilty of manslaughter if the
man turned out to be her brother looking for a place to sleep.
This is clearly an incorrect statement of the law.

If there

is any doubt in this regard, the plain language of the selfdefense statute provides the clear answer. The statute provides
for a complete defense where the actor "reasonably believes"
that force is necessary, and could easily, but does not, say
anything at all about force being "actually necessary."
Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1).

Utah

Clearly, the self-defense statute

provides for a complete defense even when the circumstances do
3

not turn out to be what the actor originally believed.
Accordingly, the State's interpretation is necessarily
incorrect, because the State asserts that imperfect selfdefense is available only under the very same circumstances
that constitute perfect self defense.

Clearly, the imperfect

self-defense provision of the manslaughter statute would have
no meaning at all if it provides for mere mitigation under the
exact same circumstances that provide a complete defense.

II. The Only Possible Interpretation of the Imperfect
Self-DefenseProvision Which Would Give it Some
Rational Effect Is the One Advanced by Coonce.
The

imperfect

self-defense

provision

provides

that

criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter where a person:
Causes the death of another under circumstances where
the actor reasonably believes the circumstances
provide a legal justification or excuse for his
conduct although the conduct is not legally
justifiable
or excusable under the existing
circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1)(c). As argued in Coonce's opening
brief, the question which is raised by the plain language of
the statute is:

Under what circumstances could a person

reasonably believe that his conduct was legally justified, when
his conduct was not actually justified? After identifying such
a circumstance, the question then becomes: Was the actor's
4

incorrect belief that he was entitled to a legal justification
objectively reasonable?
In his opening brief, Coonce assumed that there was only
one way that a person acting in self-defense would not be
legally justified in doing so - and that would be when his
belief that force was necessary was not objectively reasonable.
He

then

argued

that

reasonableness" under

the

requirement

of

"objective

Section 76-5-205(3) would necessarily

obliterate the mitigation of imperfect self-defense, since it
imposes the same standard for imperfect self-defense as for
perfect self defense.
However, after submitting his opening brief, Coonce has
realized that there are some other circumstances identified in
the statute where a person might act in self-defense, but would
not be legally justified in doing so: (1) Where some level of
force may have been justified, but not lethal force, (2) where
the actor was the aggressor at any time during the encounter,
and (3) where the actor uses force while committing a felony
or fleeing after commission of a felony. Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-5205(1) .
In looking at each one of these additional circumstances,
it is difficult to conceive how a person could reasonably
5

believe that he was legally justified, if in fact he was not.
This is so because the imperfect self-defense statute requires
that the actor must not only reasonably believe that force was
required, but

that

he was entitled

to a legal

justification;

in other words, the actor must reasonably believe that none of
the exceptions set forth in the self-defense statute applied.
For instance, if the actor used force during commission of a
felony, he will not be entitled to assert self defense even
though he reasonably believed that force was necessary to
defend himself.

Thus, such an actor could have reasonably

believed that force was necessary, but would not be entitled
to use force. Would this person fall within the definition set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1)(c) which

provides for

mitigation to manslaughter for a person who "[c]auses the death
of another under circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide
excuse

for

his

conduct

a legal

justification

or

although the conduct is not legally

justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances."?
The answer is clearly no, because although the person may have
believed that force was necessary, he could not have reasonably
believed that a legal justification existed, because the legal
justification of self defense clearly does not exist when force
6

is used during the commission of a felony.1
A similar problem arises with regards to actors who were
aggressors.

Such

actors

are

not

entitled

to

a

legal

justification under the statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402
(2) (a) and (c) (i) (1998) , and it is difficult to imagine how
such an actor could reasonably believe that he was entitled to
a legal justification since being an aggressor is intentional
conduct and the statute clearly provides that an aggressor is
not entitled the legal justification of self-defense. After
all, a reasonable person is presumed to know the law, and the
law is clear in this regard.
Finally, a different problem arises with regards to the
level of force required, which also makes it impossible to
apply the imperfect self-defense provision. The self-defense
statute provides that "a person is justified in using force
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only
if he or she reasonably

believes

that force is necessary to

prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third
Additionally, the legislature made it perfectly clear,
through the felony murder provision, that such mitigation was not
intended where force is used during the commission of a felony.
For instance, a bank robber might reasonably believe that his
life is in danger when the police arrive with their weapons
drawn, but he is not entitled have a criminal homicide charge
mitigated to manslaughter if he uses force under those
circumstances.
7

person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful
force, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony."
Accordingly, if the person's belief that a certain level of
force is required is objectively reasonable, then the person
will be entitled to the complete defense. See U.C.A. § 76-24 02(1). In other words, the only way the actor would not be
entitled to a complete defense, and thus need to rely on the
manslaughter statute, would be if his belief regarding the
level of force necessary was not objectively reasonable. Thus,
the language of the imperfect self-defense provision, requiring
that the actor's belief that he was entitled to a legal
justification be objectively reasonable, again obliterates the
defense of imperfect self-defense by apparently imposing the
same standard for imperfect self defense as for imperfect selfdefense, which could not possibly have been intended by the
Utah Legislature.
Clearly, there is simply no logical interpretation of the
plain language of Section 76-5-205(1) (c) , other than the
interpretation asserted by Coonce in his opening brief, that
would preserve the obvious intent of the legislature to provide
for mitigation where a person uses force in circumstances akin
to self-defense, but short of the standard imposed for a
8

complete defense.2
Accordingly, as Coonce asserts in his opening brief, this
Court should adopt the only reasonable interpretation of the
statute, grounded in the historical concept of imperfect selfdefense, which is that a person who kills another because he
actually believes that his own life is in danger, even though
that

belief

is

not

objectively

reasonable,

is

guilty

of

manslaughter, and not murder.
Ill.

The

The Misunderstanding of the Law by Coonce's
Counsel Did Not Constitute "Invited Error" by
Coonce
State

asserts

that

this

Court

should

not

review

Coonce's claims on appeal based on the doctrine of "invited
error."

Under this doctrine, appellate courts decline to

review on appeal "prejudicial error which was

affirmatively,

legislative records do not provide an answer to this
puzzle. During the amendment process, the lawmakers merely and
very briefly mentioned what is clear from the face of the
amendment; that is, that the lawmakers intended that the factors
which would convert criminal homicide to manslaughter should be
evaluated from an objective standard, rather than a subjective
standard. Utah State Senate, 46th Legislative Session, Senate
Bill 127, Feb. 5 and 6, 1985.
Counsel would venture to guess that the legislature intended
to impose the "objectively reasonable standard" onto the "extreme
emotional distress" provision of the manslaughter statute, which
is workable and supported in the case law, and extended the
standard to the imperfect self-defense provision without
realizing that such a standard would obliterate the mitigation
defense the legislature was trying to preserve or create.
9

knowingly, and intentionally waived . . . . " State v. Day, 815
P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991).

This doctrine prevents a defendant

in a criminal case from intentionally "inviting" prejudicial
error as a form of "appellate insurance" against an adverse
sentence. Id.
Cases in which the doctrine has been applied usually
involve knowing conduct by an attorney on the defendant's
behalf.

For instance, in Day, the

attorney was aware that

there had been some communication between a jury member and a
witness, but did not bring this to the court's attention until
after the verdict had been returned.

Likewise, in State v.

Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287 (Utah App. 1994), defense counsel
omitted non-marriage from his own jury instruction on rape, and
later, on appeal, asserted that the commission was plain error.

In the instant case, it can hardly be asserted that
defense counsel intentionally misstated the fundamental law of
the case, and repeatedly made inconsistent statement regarding
the law of the case, as a form of appellate insurance. In fact,
defense counsel did not even know which version of the statute
applied to the case until after the trial started.
p. 22-23, R. 389, p. 473-474:14-16).
10

(R. 388,

Clearly, this is not a

case

where

defense

counsel,

or

Coonce,

"affirmatively,

knowingly, and intentionally," waived anything.

In fact, as

asserted by Coonce in his opening brief, his defense counsel's
deficiencies constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, it would be fundamentally unfair to deprive Coonce
of appellate review under the plain error doctrine.
IV. Coonce Properly Marshaled the Evidence in Support of
the Verdict.
Coonce concedes that, since he made an argument based on
insufficiency of evidence, it was his obligation to Marshall
the evidence in support of the verdict.

In fact, as set forth

below, Coonce did exactly that in his opening brief.
The State incorrectly asserts that Coonce cited "only the
evidence that supports the result he would have liked the court
to reach. . .[and] ignore[d] other critical evidence that
plainly supported the trial court's verdict." Appellant's Br.
at 18. To the contrary, Coonce provided an exhaustive overview
of the evidence that supported the verdict.
The State also argues that Coonce failed to mention
certain evidence in support of the verdict, specifically, (1)
that Coonce's hand was on the gun when Charles turned to him,
(2) the palms-up gesture that Charles made as he was saying
"What are you going to do, shoot me?", (3) that Coonce shot
11

Charles seven times, (4) that Coonce "continued pumping bullets
into Charles after the victim was on the ground, dead," (5)
that Coonce fled the scene, (6) that Coonce knew the gun was
loaded, and (7) that Charles was unarmed.
In fact, Coonce did mention the evidence regarding most of
these issues in his brief.

For example, Coonce mentioned that

he had the gun in his waistband as he headed up the stairs,
Appellant's Br. At 7, and that he had his hand on the gun as
he headed up the stairs, Appellant's Br. at 9, and that Charles
saw his hand on the gun just prior to saying, "What are you
going to do, shoot me?"
With regards to Coonce's flight from the scene, Coonce
denies that this evidence supports the verdict.

Although

evidence of flight may be relevant to whether the actor
actually

did

concealment

the

criminal

act,

"evidence

of

flight

or

of a crime does not support an inference of

intentional conduct on the part of the accused." State v.
James, 819 P.2d 781. (Utah 1991).

In other words, if Coonce

denied he did the shooting at all (e.g. if there were no
witnesses), his flight from the scene would raise an inference
that he did indeed do the act. But where, as here, he does not
deny

he

did

the

shooting, but merely
12

asserts

that

the

circumstances surrounding the shooting warrant mitigation to
manslaughter, evidence of his flight can not raise an inference
regarding his mental state.
With regards to the palms-up gesture made by Coonce,
Coonce did not include the gesture because its meaning is
completely ambiguous from the record, and the trial court did
not make any findings about the meaning of the gesture.
while

And

the State describes the gesture as one of "clear

vulnerability," it could just as well be described as one of
hostility

or

aggression,

since this palms-up

gesture is

commonly used by male adolescents along with statements like
"What are you gonna do about it?" At any rate, since there is
no information in the record about the meaning of the gesture,
it does not support the verdict.
With regards to the evidence showing that Coonce knew the
gun was loaded, Coonce conceded in his opening brief that the
killing was intentional. Thus, it can clearly be presumed that
he knew the gun was loaded.

With regards to the fact that

Charles was unarmed, Coonce never insinuated that Charles was
armed.

Thus, it simply was not an issue.

Finally, with

regards to the number of shots fired, Coonce inadvertently
omitted the exact number of shots fired, but acknowledged that
13

it was several. Appellant's Br. at 10.
Finally, in support of its claim that Coonce failed to
Marshall the evidence, the State repeatedly argues that Coonce
failed to mention the various inference that might reasonably
be drawn from the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict.

Yet, the State cites no rule, and the Appellant

knows of none, which requires Coonce to not only Marshall the
evidence, but also to argue all inferences which would support
the verdict. While the court

is required to view the evidence,

and all reasonable inferences that arise therefrom, in the
light most favorable to the verdict, State v. Silva, 2000 UT
App 292, 1 13, 13 P.3d 604 (internal quotations and citations
omitted), Coonce is required to show "that the evidence to
support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and
unjust," Id.
In sum, Coonce properly marshaled all of the evidence in
support of the verdict, and properly argued that the evidence
was so unconvincing that the verdict was unreasonable.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Coonce respectfully asserts that
the evidence did not support his conviction for criminal
homicide, and that he was deprived of a fair trial by the
errors of his counsel and the misunderstanding of the law
governing his case by both the trial court and his defense
counsel. On that basis, he respectfully requests that his
conviction be vacated.
DATED this

)&

day of July, 2001.

CANDICE JOHN
Attorney for Michael Coonce
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